

**REMARKS**

This is in response to the Office Action mailed on July 12, 2005, in which claims 1-4 and 6 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Murayama et al. (U.S. Pat. No. 6,282,458) in view of Brown (U.S. Pat. No. 3,527,985); claims 7-15, 17-26, 28-35, and 37 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Murayama et al. as modified by Brown as applied to claim 1, and further in view of McCarrick et al. (U.S. Pat. No. 5,953,682); and claims 5, 16, 27, and 36 were objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. With this Amendment, editorial amendments to claims 12 and 32 are made to correct punctuation errors in the wherein clauses. Claims 1-37 remain pending in the present application.

Claim 1 was rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Murayama et al. in view of Brown. To establish *prima facie* obviousness there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference. *In re Kotzab*, 217 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000); MPEP 2143.01. With regard to claim 1, the Office Action states that Murayama et al. fail to teach an intrinsic safety barrier located in the non-hazard zone of the manufacturing system and connected between the communication means and the controller means to limit electrical energy passing to the communication means. Office Action, Page 2. The Office Action supplied this deficiency in Murayama et al. by turning to the disclosure of Brown. However, this combination is not a proper one.

Claim 1 as originally submitted recites a manufacturing system including a hazard zone and a non-hazard zone. Located in the hazard zone are "storage means ... for electrically storing information" and "communication means ... for storing information to and reading information from the storage means." Located in the non-hazard zone are "controller means ... for controlling the system based on information read from the storage means by the communication means" and "an intrinsic safety barrier ... to limit electrical energy passing to the communication means." In order to allow for the use of the storage means

and the communication means in the hazard zone, consideration must be made for safety and protection against the possibility of ignition, since this electrical equipment could potentially cause ignition of hazardous substances in the hazard zone. In particular, consideration must be given to limiting electrical energy at potential sources of ignition in electrical circuits (e.g., the controller means) to such low levels that even under abnormal conditions there is no possibility of the electrical energy igniting an explosive atmosphere in the hazard zone. Page 8, lines 9-16. The intrinsic safety barrier limits the electrical energy flowing from the controller means to the communication means. Page 8, lines 17-20.

Neither Murayama et al. nor Brown teach or suggest a manufacturing system as recited in claim 1. Murayama et al. teach an olfactory control system 100 that receives an input control signal through an interface unit 105, and a controller 106 selectively activates one or more of aroma releasing units 102-1 through 102-n or one or more of aroma-removing agent releasing units 104-1 through 104-n based upon the input control signal. Each of the releasing units 102-1 through 102-n is connected to a corresponding independent aroma storing unit 101-1 through 101-n ... and each aroma storing unit contains an aroma causing agent. Each of the releasing units 104-1 through 104-n is connected to a corresponding independent aroma-removing agent storing unit 103-1 through 103-n, and each aroma-removing agent storing unit contains an aroma-removing agent. A fan 107 causes an air flow containing one or more of the released aroma-causing agents toward air output vent 100. See Col. 3, line 64 - col. 4, line 21. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 3A and 3B, the olfactory control system 100 is connected to a personal computer 401, which provides the input control signal to the olfactory control system 100.

The Office Action states that it would have been obvious to combine the electrical barrier device of Brown with the olfactory control system 100 of Murayama et al. "due to the fact that a proper precaution can be taken to control the unsafe rising of power energy for the purposes of successfully controlling a hazardous are reducing the risks involved in handling inflammable gases or liquid." Office Action, page 3. The mere fact that references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests the desirability of the combination. *In re Mills*, 916

F.2d 680 (Fed. Cir. 1990); MPEP 2143.01. Murayama et al. do not teach or suggest a “hazardous area” or the use of “inflammable gases or liquid” that would require limiting the electrical energy flowing to olfactory control system 100. In fact, because olfactory control system 100 involves the intentional and controlled release of aroma causing and aroma removing agents into the air based on a control signal, the agents stored in storing units 101 and 103 are likely designed to be non-flammable. In other words, the intentional release of a flammable substance into the air for the sake of olfactory stimulation would be neither beneficial nor logical. Consequently, there is no use or benefit for an intrinsic safety barrier to limit electrical energy to olfactory control system 100, since there are no ignitable or explosive substances involved. Therefore, the combination of Murayama et al. and Brown is not a proper one, and the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) should accordingly be withdrawn.

Claims 12, 23, and 32 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Murayama et al. as modified by Brown as applied to claim 1, and further in view of McCarrick et al. For the reasons discussed above, the combination of Murayama et al. and Brown as applied to claim 1 is not a proper one, since olfactory control system 100 does not involve a hazard zone or explosive substances, and there is no need for an intrinsic safety barrier to limit electrical energy to olfactory control system 100. In addition, this combination in further view of McCarrick et al. does not teach or suggest all claim limitations. To establish *prima facie* obviousness of a claimed invention, all the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art. *In re Royka*, 490 F.2d 981, 180 USPQ 580 (CCPA 1974); MPEP 2143.03. The systems of claims 12, 23, and 32 all include a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag and a radio frequency (RF) antenna. The RF antenna is electromagnetically coupled to the RFID tag and is for storing information to and reading information from the RFID tag. McCarrick et al. does not teach or suggest that inventory control collar 100 is an RFID tag or that inventory control probe 300 is an RF antenna. Rather, “data is written and read from the inventory control collar 100 with the inventory control probe 300 by concurrently touching probe tip 310, having terminal tips 312 and 314 to the conductive rings 150 and 160 exposed on the upper surface of the inventory control collar 100.” Col. 7, lines 34-40.

“Data is transmitted through conductive rings 150 and 160 to and from the memory 200.” Col. 7, lines 40-41. Inventory control collar 100 is only programmable when probe 300 is in direct physical contact with conductive rings 150 and 160. However, there is no teaching or suggestion that probe 300 is capable of communicating with inventory control collar 100 via RF transmissions, as is required for the RF antenna to communicate with the RFID tag in claims 12, 23, and 32. Therefore, because the combination of Murayama et al. and Brown as applied to claim 1 is not a proper one, and because this combination further in view of McCarrick et al. does not teach or suggest each and every limitation of claims 12, 23, and 32, the rejection of claims 12, 23, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) should be withdrawn.

Claims 2-4 and 6 were also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Murayama et al. in view of Brown, and claims 7-11, 13-15, 17-22, 24-26, 28-31, 33-35, and 37 were also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Murayama et al. as modified by Brown as applied to claim 1, and further in view of McCarrick et al. As discussed above, claims 1, 12, 23, and 32 are now in a condition for allowance. Claims 2-4 and 6-11 depend from allowable claim 1, claims 13-15 and 17-22 depend from allowable claim 12, claims 24-26 and 28-31 depend from allowable claim 23, and claims 33-35 and 37 depend from allowable claim 32, and as such are allowable with their respective independent base claim. In addition, it is respectfully submitted that the combinations of features recited in claims 2-4, 6-11, 13-15, 17-22, 24-26, 28-31, 33-35 and 37 are patentable on their own merits, although this does not need to be specifically addressed herein since any claim depending from a patentable independent claim is also patentable. See MPEP 2143.03, citing *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

In that claims 1, 12, 23, and 32 are in condition for allowance, the objections to claims 5, 16, 27, and 36, which depend therefrom, should be withdrawn, and claims 5, 16, 27, and 36 be allowed.


**CONCLUSION**

In view of the foregoing, it is believed that all claims in the present application are in condition for allowance. Reconsideration and allowance of claims 1-37 are respectfully requested.

Respectfully submitted,

KINNEY & LANGE, P.A.

Date: 10/11/05

By: 

David R. Fairbairn, Reg. No. 26,047

THE KINNEY & LANGE BUILDING

312 South Third Street

Minneapolis, MN 55415-1002

Telephone: (612) 339-1863

Fax: (612) 339-6580

DRF/PGK:hlw